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AROUND AND BEYOND THE SEC-THE DISENFRANCHISED
STOCKHOLDER
DAVID C. BAYNE, S. J.*
In aft analysis of the SEC proxy regulations two notable deficiencies
recommend themselves for correction by amendment: I. Evasion of Regula-
tion by Non-Solicitation, and II. The Double Standard of Applicability.
BACKGROUND
The story of proxy regulation, and the use of the proxy itself,1 is the
story of an evolution from the early days-when the shareholders' meeting
performed a full, free, and democratic function, and substantially every
shareholder attended-to the present, when few shareholders even consider
attending2 and, once present, frequently have considerable difficulty in
obtaining a hearing.3
*A.B., 1939, University of Detroit; M.A., 1946, Loyola University of Chicago;
LL.B., 1947, LL.M., 1948, Georgetown University School of Law; S.J.D., 1949, Yale Law
School; Candidate for the Licentiate in Sacred Theology, West Baden College of
Loyola University of Chicago, West Baden Springs, Indiana; member of the District of
Columbia and Federal Bars.
1. A proxy to vote shares of stock is an authority given by a shareholder who has
the right to vote, to another to exercise this right. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119
N.E. 559 (1918). The same definition could be applied to any authority to perform any
act in execution of a right held by a shareholder. In some instances there is enclosed
with the notice of the shareholders' meeting a proxy form which is merely to be signed
and returned in the self-addressed and stamped envelope, giving the desired authority to
the management. The procedure may be mechanical and perfunctory.
2. Much of this is due to a complexity of factors incident to the growth of the
corporate system. There are some indications, however, that management is not displeased
with the status quo. For example, although the directors meet in New York City, F. W.
Woolworth continues to hold its meetings in Watertown, N.Y., in the face of continued
protests from small shareholders. Anaconda Copper meets in Butte, Montana. Southern
Pacific has moved its meeting from Spring Station, Kentucky, to Wilmington, Delaware,
even farther from its ownership. Continental Can has recently acceded to shareholder
requests and moved from isolated Millbrook, New York, to New York City. Kaiser-
Frazer meets in Reno, Nevada, which is far from its ownership concentration in the
east. The management of U.S. Steel opposes shareholder requests to move from Hoboken
to New York City. Shareholder complaint has also recently been levelled at New York
Central, Valspar, Bethlehem Steel and Standard Oil of New Jersey, because of the
locus of corporate meetings. This point is discussed at some length in Gilbert, Manage-
mernt and the Public Stockholder, 28 HARV. Bus. REV. NO. 4, 73, 74 (July 1950). See
also, Gilbert, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATION MEEr-
INs 1-4 (1949).
3. The status of the stockholder at the present-day corporation meeting can be esti-
mated from the following statement, accurate and representative in spite of its light tone:
"I'd never attended a stockholders' meeting, so I expected to be welcomed cordially
and to be treated like one of the owners. You can see how naive I was. The meeting
was a disgrace. . . . . I got up to ask a question, but before I had a chance to say
anything, one of the officers sitting in the back of the room made a motion to adjourn.
It was seconded and passed in no time. I was still standing there when the chairman
said, 'And now a delightful collation awaits you in the adjoining room,' and everybody
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Since an absentee vote was not contemplated by the common law, the
common law had little to say about the proxy; voting by a shareholder had to
be viva voce et praesens."4 This left the matter up to the states, and the states
usually returned the deference by leaving the matter up to the common law;
thus the proxy was virtually unregulated in 1933.1
However, the need for a change from the unprincipled days before and
during the twenties was patent. It was widely felt that the proxy machinery
could no longer remain exclusively in the hands of insiders, nor be simply a
device for perpetuation of control,' for management indemnification, 7 for
blanket ratification and approval of any and all management acts,8 and for
approval of envisaged future transactions,9 officer pension plans, ° stock
optionsi or management employment contracts.' 2 Nor did the other elements
of corporate evolution, in addition to the passing of the shareholder participa-
tion in the shareholders' meeting, aid the return to corporate democracy. The
nation-wide dispersion of shares, the stronger hold of management, the
smaller and smaller interests of the individual shareholder-all aided manage-
ment in retaining control and made the job of devising effective and feasible
went for the free lunch. There I was, a part owner-I had ten shares-and I had been
treated. like a tramp by these people, who were my employees. I was horrified."
Lewis D. Gilbert, quoted in John Bainbridge, Profiles-The Talking Stockholder, 24
THE NEW YORKER, No. 42, 40 (December 11, 1948). The narration is of Mr. Gilbert's
attendance in 1933 at a meeting of the Consolidated Gas Company.
4. See Commonwealth ex rel. Verree v. Bringhurst, 103 Pa. 134 (1883) ; Manson
v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918); 5 FLETcHER, Cyc. CORP. 167. See also
Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MIcHa. L. REV. 38 (1942) ; Note, 53 HARv. L. Rxv. 1165 (1940).
5. The statutory provisions of the states confine themselves mainly to provisions
dealing with the expiration date of the proxy, revocability, length of term and similar
matters. There is practically no regulation similar to the present SEC proxy provisions.
The state statutes generally leave the matter to the corporate charter and by-laws. See
Regulation of Proxy Solicitations, 33 ILL. L. REv. 914 (1939) ; Hearing Before the Com-
nittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 4314, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 90 et seq.
et passimn (1933).
6. See sample proxies in REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix
D, Exhibit B, at 77 et seq.
7. See Notice of Annual Stockholders' Meeting, Aluminum Company of America,
REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B.
8. See Proxy for Annual Meeting of March 21st, 1944, The Associated Laundries of
A erica, Inc., REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B.
9. See Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Atlas Plywood Corporation,
REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B.
10. See Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Draper Corporation, REPORT OF THE SEC
(1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B.
11. See Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Clinchfield Coal Company, RE-
PORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B.
12. See Notice of Special Meeting, American Potash & Chemical Corporation, RE-
PORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. infra note 19, Appendix D, Exhibit B. See passiln also
for illustrations of omissions, use of fine print for concealment and general failure to
disclose.
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proxy regulation difficult." But, it seemed agreed that lack of disclosure
and subtle deceptions should give way to an intelligent vote, coupled with
and based on an understanding of disclosed facts.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the SEC was given the task
of devising a set of regulations and rules (which later applied under the
PUHCA and the ICA) that would adequately compensate for the deficiencies
of state statutes and the common law and provide a substitute for the evanes-
cent meeting.' 4 The Act makes it
unlawful for any person . . . to solicit . . . any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security . . . registered on any
national securities exchange in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.15
This provision is, moreover, very intimately related to the overall disclosure
.13. Nor did the proponents of the securities legislation find themselves without strong
opposition. See references at notes 5 and 14. For an interesting exposition of the argu-
ments of the opposition see also Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, H. R. REP. Nos. 1493, 1821, 2o9, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 149-159 (1943),
and especially the objections of Lewis H. Brown, president of Johns-Manville Corp.,
Charles S. Garland, partner of Alex. Brown & Sons, Baltimore, Edward Hopkinson, Jr.,
senior partner of Drexel & Co., and chairman of the executive committee of Baldwin
Locomotive Works, Emil Schram, president, New York Stock Exchange, Robert W.
White, vice-president, Union Carbide and Carbon Co. In sum their objections were: the
shareholders have not demanded any changes; revision would induce delisting of se-
curities; the paper work would impede war work; the re;isions were, outside SEC
authority; and the minimum disclosure would become the maximum. See also Sugges-
tions for Revisions of S.E.A. of 1934 by the Committee on Security Regulation of Corn-
7nerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc. 6 (1947). In connection with the op-
position of the American Bar Association see Bayne, S.J., The Tucker Fiasco, 81
A-MERICA 153. 155. 156 (April 30, 1949) ; see also the further comment and reprint of this
article in The SEC, the American Bar Association, and the Tucker Fiasco, Extension of
Remarks of Hon. Walter A. Lynch of New York in the House of Representatives, May
18, 1949, 95 CoNG. REc. No. 88, A3220 (May 18, 1949).
14. For a sketch of the history see 10 SEC ANN. REP. 51 et seq. (1944) ; H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 14 (1934) ; SEN. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1934) ; Hearings on S. 24o8, op. cit. infra note 19, at 9 et seq. For the history of the
proxy in general, see Axe, Corporate Proxies, op. cit. supra note 4.
15. Section 14 (a), 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1946).
"It was the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity for the operation of cor-
porate suffrage. The control of great corporations by a very few persons was the abuse
at which Congress struck in enacting Section 14 (a)." SEC v. Transamerica Corporation
163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
The same fundamental purpose of a return of control to the shareholder was at the
base of the provisions in the Holding Company Act. Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq. (1946). The Senate Committee
said relative to the proxy provisions in that act: "Subsection (e) covers the solicitation
of proxies in connection with all holding companies and subsidiary company securities so
that such solicitation will not afford the basis for subtle control adverse to the interests
of investors who'have a right to be kept fairly and properly informed by representatives
of their own choosing as against selfish self-constituted, self-perpetuating cliques." SEN.
REP. No. 621, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1935).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
purposes of the securities acts.16 The Commission, ". . . to protect investors
by requiring the disclosure of certain information to them and by affording
them an opportunity for active participation in the affairs of their company,'
' 7
promulgated comprehensive regulations providing for a most substantial
variety of information to be given when a proxy is sought.
Hence the proxy was to bear a heavy burden in the projected restoration
of corporate democracy.18 But the proxy, even in a legitimate form, can be
valuable to the shareholder only if he uses it intelligently. In turn, this can
occur only if the shareholder is informed of what has transpired in the
corporation during the recent period, what is to be discussed, voted on, and
approved. This disclosure the Act compels.' 9 (A complete resume of the
SEC proxy regulations appears as an appendix to this article.)
I. EVASION OF REGULATION BY NON-SOLICITATION
One of the two major deficiencies in the SEC proxy provisions permits
complete non-disclosure to shareholders, and hence a denial of corporate
16. Thus, concerning the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the Senate Committee
Report said:
"In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in
which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only as to
the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of policy,
which are decided at stockholders' meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without
explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the matters for which authority to
cast his vote is sought." SEN. REP. No. '455, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1934).
17. 13 SEC ANN. REP. 41 (1947).
18. Thus Louis Loss, Associate General Counsel of the SEC reported:
"The proxy instrument is an essential device in the modern corporation with its
thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of scattered stockholders. It is a device
which can be used for good or ill. If stockholders are informed of the affairs of their
corporations and given an opportunity to cast their proxy votes intelligently, the proxy
device may well turn out to have been the salvation of our present-day corporate system.
On the other hand, if the proxy instrument is no more than a blank check, the whole
device simply makes for self-perpetuation of management and leaves the door open, as
the Commission said in its 1946 report, 'for executive irresponsibility and outright fraud.'"
Some aspects of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Legislative Program, an
address given before the New York Young Republican Club, New York City, April 1st,
1949, at 5.
19. Attempts to amend the 1934 Act came in 1941 and 1942. The summary of the
SEC's stand on the amendment proposals was embodied in Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission on Proposals for Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, House Committee Print, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). Efforts at amendment were re-
newed in 1946 in A Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on a Proposal to
Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities, House Doc. No. 672, 29th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946). The SEC announced in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4399 (January 9,
1950) the transmittal to Congress of a supplemental report bringing up to date the, report
originally submitted in 1946. This report was also entitled A Proposal to Safeguard
Investors in Unregistered Securities, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington,
D.C. (1950). These latest efforts of the SEC are embodied in the so-called Frear Bill.
See Hearings on S. 24o8 before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, United States Senate, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (February 7-10, 1950).
SEC
democracy by the simple expedient of failing, either partially or completely, to
solicit proxies. This is not legally reprehensible because Regulation X-14
and Schedule 14A regulating the proxy and the proxy statement come into
operation only if and when the management determines to solicit. This loop-
hole results in major possibilities of abuse.20
Practices of non-solicitation generally follow one of three types. (And
in the main, the particular effects resulting from each of the types are reliable
indicia of the motives of management in avoiding the solicitation.)
I. Total Non-solicitation Without Control. A management without
possession of a controlling block of stock or without a readily accessible block
in a small group of shareholders may fail to solicit altogether if it is free
from the necessity of having the shareholders approve or authorize any
management proposal or activity.
An illustration of this type is The Glidden Company. Glidden has both
its common stock and convertible preferred stock registered on the New York
Stock Exchange and hence is subject to the SEC proxy regulations.
The company has consolidated assets of $77,000,000.21 It had average
net sales of $180,000,000 in the years 1947, 1948, and 1949 and an average net
profit of $10,000,000 annually for the same period.22  The Company has
17,000 shareholders and no one owner holds as much as 10%.2s As of January
31, 1950 all directors and officers as a group owned 3.4% of the common
stock and less than 1% of the preferred stock. 4 The ten major officers, who
are all directors as well, receive aggregate salaries of $606,762 annually.2 5
The following letter in answer to an inquiry concerning solicitation for
the 1949 annual meeting expresses Glidden's reasons for non-solicitation:
Our Executive Committee has decided, after carefully consider-
ing the matter, that the management should not solicit proxies for
20. The problem was discussed in SEC Report on Proposals for Amendinents to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, op. cit. supra note 19, at
35. The possibilities of meeting the problem under the present status of proxy regulations
is discussed in Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. RaV. 796, 819
(1950). The general conclusion is that the Commission is at present without power to
meet this problem adequately.
21. Thirty-Second Annual Report, Fiscal Year Ended October 31, 1949, The Glidden
Company.
22. See Prospectus, The Glidden Company, Blythe & Co. 7 (March 15, 1950).
23. The Glidden Company, SEC 1934 Act Registration File No. 1-531. Public
Document Room, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C. There are
1,784,000 shares of common stock outstanding. The prospectus cited note 22 supra an-
nounces an offering of 178,535 shares of common stock. There are outstanding 199,540
shares of convertible preferred stock.
24. Prospectus, op. cit. supra note 22, at 15.
25. Ibid. Adrian D. Joyce, Chairman of the Board, receives $96,500 and the president,
his son, receives $75,000. For a picture of the strictly business background of Glidden
and the extent of its enterprise, see House That Joyce Built, 38 FORTUNE, No. 5, 95
(May 1949).
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the Annual Meeting to be held on February 10, 1949 and incur the
expense involved in preparing and printing a proxy statement,
postage, etc., since the Directors do not have any particular matter
which they wish to submit to the stockholders.
(Signed) 26
In an eleven-year survey.made of the Glidden Company's proxy-soliciting
practices it was found that proxies were solicited by management only once
for an anfiual meeting.27 Thus, although the shareholders may have received
some information, only once for these eleven annual meetings has the com-
pany been compelled to make the complete disclosures required by SEC
proxy regulations.
The concrete results of such a policy are summarized in another letter
from Glidden to an inquiring shareholder:
3. Although some shares were represented by proxies which
were sent in unsolicited and some stockholders were present in per-
son, a quorum was not present and no business could be transacted.
4. Under the Company's Regulations, the directors and officers
must hold over until their successors are elected and qualified and
since a quorum was not present at the 'meeting, it was necessary for.
the directors to hold over.
(Signed) 28
In these circumstances, non-solicitation, not touched on by the present
SEC proxy provisions, will usually result in failure of a quorum, with the
consequence that the annual meeting will perforce adjourn sine die.29  Pur-
suant to the by-laws the directors must hold over until their successors are
chosen; yet an election of successors cannot occur without a meeting and
the possibility of transacting business."
But more significant are the possible results of non-solicitation: 1) Com-
plete non-disclosure to the shareholder of the basic information concerning
the meeting and the affairs of the corporation. 2) Effectual denial of the
26. (Emphasis added). Copy on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
27. The Glidden Company, SEC Proxy File No. 11-109. The period covered in the
survey was 1940-1950 inclusive. In addition to the solicitation for the annual meeting of
1947, The Glidden Company held two Special Meetings during the period studied for
which proxies were solicited. In October, 1945 a meeting was held to split the common
stock; in October 1947 the meeting was to approve a retirement plan for employees and
officers, with no other business contemplated.
28. (Emphasis added). Copy on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
29. Thus, The Glidden Company announced to a questioning shareholder: "The An-
nual Meeting of the Common Stockholders of The Glidden Company, held in Cleveland,
Ohio, on Thursday, February 9, 1950, in the absence of a quorum was adjourned sine die."
From a letter of The Glidden Company, February 27, 1950. Copy on file, Business Sec-
tion, Library, West Baden College.
30. The policy of General Paint Corporation changed with the annual meeting of
1950. Prior to that time non-solicitation resulted in the absence of a quorum and ad-
journment of the annual meetings. Records of the Los Angeles Stock Exchange; Notice
of Annual Meeting of Stockholders, General Paint Corporation, February 14, 1950.
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opportunity to vote and participate in the conduct of the firm. 3) The dis-
persed shareholders, although perhaps representing as high as 99% of the
stock, are thereby precluded from easy organization, from otherwise accessible
control, from effectual opposition to management policies. 4) The elimination
of the opportunity for shareholder initiation of plans or proposals through
the proxy machinery. 5) Restricting vocal opposition.
II. Total Non-solicitation With Control. Management may fail to solicit
where 1) management holds control, either itself or in close affiliation, al-
though its holding may be a bare 51% of the voting shares; and 2) the manage-
ment is faced with the actual need of holding a meeting. For example, action
at a meeting duly called and held may be necessary to eliminate a provision of
the corporate charter. Non-solicitation, of course, does not block a quorum
or the consequent transaction of business.
This type of non-solicitation is seen in the maneuvering of Coty, Inc.
Coty has net assets of over $6,000,00031 and over 5,000 shareholders. 32 In
August 1950 the directors of Coty held 51% of the 1,488,906 voting shares.33
The juxtaposition of non-solicitation and solicitation at two recent meet-
ings of Coty-special and annual, held on the same day-presents an apt illus-
tration of the practice of non-solicitation by a management having control
and a quorum in hand.
Since 1922, the Certificate of Incorporation 'of Coty has pr6vided for
cumulative voting in the election of the directors, thereby permitting the
minority shareholders a pro rata representation on the board. The manage-
ment of Coty determined to remove this cumulative voting provision because,
said the president of Coty, "a group which might be acting 'for selfish motives'
had been acquiring stock to obtain representation on the board of directors." 3'
The elimination of a charter provision required the action of the holders of
a majority of the outstanding shares of stock. The further business facing
the meeting included the election of the directors, and submission for share-
holder approval of two proposals advanced by shareholders. These four items
could all have been considered at one meeting. The annual meeting was
scheduled for October 23, 1950.35
The management sent out a "Notice of Special and Annual Meetings of
Stockholders"; both were to be held on October 23. At 10:00 A.M. the
31. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1950).
32. Ibid.
33. Notice of Special and Annual Meetings of Stockholders, Coty, Inc., 4, 5 (Sep-
tember 26, 1950). Of these 765,213 shares held by the directors, 47.28% or 708,745 are
held by Yvonne Cotnareanu. The Chairman of the Board, Grover A. Whalen, owns
4,000 shares.
The directors of Coty receive annual salaries ranging from $40,000 to $50,000.
34. Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1950; the Sunday Star, Wilmington, October 29,
1950.
35. Notice, op. cit. supra note 33.
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Special Meeting was to consider only the amendment to the Certificate of
Incorporation. The annual meeting was to follow immediately at 11:00 A.M.
for the election of directors and consideration of the two shareholder pro-
posals. In the notice the company stated: "For your convenience a proxy for
the Annual Meeting is enclosed. No solicitation of proxies for the Special
Meeting will be made.""6
At the Special Meeting the cumulative voting provision was eliminated by
the vote of 773,988 management shares; 60 votes were cast in opposition by
a minority shareholder.3 7 The president of Coty did not reveal the identity of
the group seeking representation on the board, but did point out pertinently
that if proxies had been solicited for the Special Meeting, "we would have had
to disclose completely the information. 38  The minority shareholder's attempts
from the floor to have the Special Meeting adjourned until proxies could be
solicited were blocked.3 9
In addition to non-disclosure and the complete denial of a minority vote,
this type of situation can lead to other harmful results: 1) Securing to
management the full benefits of actually holding a meeting and transacting
business. 2) Avoidance of the odium, often experienced under Type I supra,
accompanying an open and continued refusal to hold the annual meeting. 3)
Removal of the opportunity for shareholder initiation of plans and proposals.
4) Elimiration of two kinds of opposition-a. Where the charter requires
approval of some proposal by two-thirds or more of the voting shares present
at a meeting, the holders of 51% can work a substantial incursion into
minority rights by not soliciting proxies which may oppose majority action.
Non-solicitation will usually result in the shares held by management being
about the only shares present at the meeting. b. Non-solicitation of proxies,
and the frequently indefinite notices of what will transpire at the meetings,
tend to eliminate any vocal objections and discussion at the meeting. Although
this opposition is doomed of necessity to be ineffectual, it carries with it a
number of factors offensive to management-the poor public relations, the
nuisance value, and the possible ill-effects on the market value of the shares
that attend suspicion of chicanery. These are all avoided by holding the
meeting and conducting business without dissension.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Women's Wear Daily, October 24, 1950; the Sunday Star, Wilmington, October
29, 1950.
38. Ibid.
39. Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1956; Women's Wear Daily, October 24, 1950;
the Sunday Star, Wilmington, October 29, 1950. The proceedings at the meetings prompted
a shareholder to comment:
"... that Coty's failure to solicit proxies indicated a definite need for new legislation
at Washington to require prbxy solicitation under the rules of the Securities and Exchange
Commission." From On Rodney Square by Henry L. Sholly, in the Wilmington Star,
October 29, 1950.
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III. Partial Non-solicitation Without Control. This may occur where
1) a meeting must or is desired to be held in order to secure authorization for
a plan or proposal, 2) management does not have a quorum in hand, 3) there
are large blocks of voting shares in the hands of a few accessible and con-
trollable shareholders which will guarantee control of the meeting.
International Shoe Co. is one of the larger companies following this type
of solicitation. (Net assets exceed $100,000,0004 ' and the firm has over
11,000 shareholders. 41) The company expresses its policy in the following
letter:
We informed you in our letter of February 10, 1948 that this
company considered it 'desirable and feasible to solicit proxies from
larger shareholders.' That was done this year in connection with the
meeting to be held on February 28, 1949. There are approximately
425 from whom the proxies were solicited.
(Signed) 42
Thus the protection of the SEC proxy provisions was afforded to less
than 4% of the shareholders of International Shoe in 1949.,1
This policy of partial solicitation can bring non-disclosure, denial of the
vote to the bulk of the shareholders and hence the minimization of effective
minority opposition. At the same time the management can have the benefit of
a legally conducted meeting and avoid the stigma which attaches to not
holding meetings.
40. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1950).
41. International Shoe Company, SEC 1934 Act Registration No. 1-91.
42. Copy on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College. "Our letter of
February 10, 1948," referred to in the letter above, stated:
Because of the time and expense involved, the company has not made it a practice to
solicit proxies from all of its 11,000 stockholders, but it has considered it desirable and
feasible to solicit proxies from larger stockholders.
I should point out that the fact that you did not receive a proxy form along with the
'Notice of the Annual Stockholders' Meeting' did not preclude your voting your stock
in person or by any proxy whom you might wish to designate."
Letter, International Shoe Company, St. Louis, Missouri, dated February 10, 1948; copy
on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
43. International Shoe Company, SEC Proxy File No. 11-112. One shareholder in
International Shoe Company attempted to circumvent the management policy and re-
ceived the following:
I am instructed by Messrs. Frank C. Rand, Byron A. Gray, Andrew W. Johnson
and Oliver F. Peters, who are named in the proxy you have sent us, to inform you that
they decline to act as your proxy at the annual stockholders' meeting of the International
Shoe Co. on Feb. 28th, subject to the conditions indicated in the proxy.
It is suggested that you select your own proxy and place upon him such conditions,
limitations, and directions, as you choose.
Your proxy is reurned herewith.
(signed)"
Letter, International Shoe Company, St. Louis, Missouri, dated February 17, 1949; copy
on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
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THE EXTENT OF THE PRACTICE
The exact number of companies which follow Glidden, Coty, and Inter-
national Shoe through'the loophole in the disclosure provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act is not known. No authoritative up-to-date survey of the
extent of the practice has been made, either as to complete failure to solicit,
or partial solicitation.
A survey made ten years ago indicated a general increase in the practice
of non-solicitation. At that time, corporations listed on the New York Stock
Exchange which failed to solicit proxies increased from 1.8% in 1938 to more
than 11% in the years 1939, 1940, and 1941. Non-solicitation in firms listed
on the New York Curb Exchange rose from 6.5% in 1938 to 27% in 1939, to
29% in 1940, and to 31% in 1941." 4 The report of the SEC for 1949 indicated
that about one-third of the listed corporations failed to solicit proxies.45
A survey made by the writer shows a number of large firms which cur-
rently pursue a policy of non-solicitation. The following firms, as indicated
by the records of the New York Stock Exchange, the New York Curb Ex-
change and the SEC, have avoided solicitation for the years 1940-1949
inclusive :46
Corporation Total Assets
(1) Crown Central Petroleum Corporation $19,400,000
(2) Esquire, Inc. 8,000,000
(3) The A. C. Gilbert Company 47  5,900,000
44. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed
Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
77 Cong., 1st Sess. 1144 (1941).
45. 15 SEC ANN. REP. 34, 48 (1949).
46. Other material data is available on the firms selected:
SEC 1934 Act
Registration SEC Proxy
Corporation File No. File No.
(1) Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 1-1059 11-883
(2) Esquire, Inc. 1-2983 11-1771
(3) The A. C. Gilbert Co. 1-254 11-1808
(4) The Glidden Co. 1-531 11-109
(5) R. G. LeTourneau, Inc. 1-2496 (A)
(6) The Silex Co. 1-2946 11-1692
(7) Spear and Co. 1-775 11-468
(8) Johnson and Johnson 1-3215 (A)
(9) Venezuelan Petroleum Company 1-1155 11-293
(10) A. S. Beck Shoe Corporation 1-3267 (A)
(11) Wilson Brothers 1-3329 (A)
(A) These firms were not assigned SEC proxy numbers since no proxies have ever
been solicited under SEC regulations.
47. During the year 1946 the A. C. Gilbert Co. solicited proxies for a special meeting
of stockholders. This was the only time during the 1940-1950 period inclusive that the
firm solicited proxies from its shareholders.
SEC
(4) The Glidden Company48  76,700,000
(5) R. G. LeTourneau, Inc. 21,200,000
(6) The Silex Company 2,900,000
(7) Spear and Company 14,300,000
(8) Johnson and Johnson49  80,200,000
(9) Venezuelan Petroleum Company 63,100,000
(The following firms have never solicited
proxies under SEC regulations)
(10) A. S. Beck Shoe Corporation (1946-1950 incl.) 13,600,000
(11) Wilson Brothers (1947-1950 incl.) 5,700,000
These random selections indicate that a noteworthy section of the so-
called regulated firms are not regularly soliciting proxies. And to these
samplings many other firms occupying substantial positions in the national
economy could be added. "
48. See supra note 27. The Glidden Company solicited at one annual meetifig during
this period and at two special meetings.
49. Tile survey in regard to Johnson and Johnson applies only to the last ten years.
Johnson and Johnson has approximately 1580 shareholders. Letter, dated October 23,
1950, on file, Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
Johnson and Johnson has evidenced a determined policy of non-solicitation. The
agenda of business, available at the Special Meeting of Stockholders of Johnson and
Johnson, September 7, 1949, carried at the bottom of the first page the following
parenthetical remarks:
"(Note: You will recall that Mr. John Gilbert is apparently planning to attend. If he
follows his usual tactics, he will object to the fact that proxies have not been solicited.
You will probably want to reply that in accordance with the statement you made at the
previous meeting we have presehted our views on this and other matters to the SEC
which is in process of revising its requirements. Pending some modification of their
views along the lines of our suggestions, we are not prepared to solicit proxies. If, as he
started to do at the last meeting, he moves an adjournment in order that proxies may be
solicited, we will have to put the motion to a vote and vote it down.)" Copy on file,
Business Section, Library, West Baden College.
50. For example, the following firms have not solicited proxies for their last annual
meeting at least:
SEC 1934 Act Date of
Registration SEC Proxy Gross Annual
Corporation File No. File No. Assets Meeting
George A. Fuller Company 1-458 11-1666 $12,064,991 4-11-50
G. Krueger Brewing Company 1-1331 11-688 9,083,817 5-24-50
The Outlet Company 1-1209 11-40 8,841,764 4-19-50
Fedders-Quigan Corporation 1-2150 11-399 10,279,042 4- 3-50
Casco Products Corporation 1-2639 11-1377 3,924,733 6- 6-50
Penn Electrid Switch Company 1-2779 (A) 3,346,446 3-28-50
Shellmar Products Corporation 1-3326 11-2198 15,351,241 4-10-50
(A) This firm was not assigned a SEC proxy number since no proxies have ever
been solicited under SEC regulations.
Copies of all notices of 1950 annual meetings of these firms are on file, Business Section,
Library, West Baden College. Asset figures are all from MooDY's INDUSTRIAL MANUAL
(1950). National Steel has not solicited proxies for any meeting, annual or special, in
the years ending September 30, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, accord-
ing to the records on file in the New York Stock Exchange. The firm had $129,042,022
in assets as of December 31, 1949. MooDYs INDUSTRIAL MANUAL (1950).
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RECOMiMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT
The problem of evasion of regulation by non-solicitation has not received
the national attention which it would seem to warrant. The currently pro-
posed amendment to the Securities Exchange Act, the Frear Bill, does not
remedy the situation; and hence one may assume that even if the amendment
carries, one-third of the larger corporations will continue a practice of non-
solicitation. The investor protection and corporate democracy provided for
by the SEC proxy provisions will be accorded only at the sufferance of
management.
At most the policy is a modern, corporate form of benevolent despotism.
It is not corporate democracy at its best; it cannot be said in any wise that the
possibility of abuse offered management is a corporate desideratum. Con-
sidering the possibilities of abuse in vacuo and as outlined in the Glidden, Coty
and International Shoe illustrations, there seems little question that a solution
for the problem is needed. Various suggestions have been offered but no one
of them has carried a plan far enough to work an effective restoration of
corporate democracy. For it would appear that it is primarily through ade-
quate information and a vote that the shareholders may first detect and later
correct management abuse should it perchance arise.
A recent commentator touched on the question and concluded that "a
careful study of the problem might suggest that effective corporate democracy
can be achieved only through a disinterested, active participation in corporate
affairs by some private or public agency charged with representing the view-
points and protecting the interests of the various non-management groups."51
Such thoughts are reminiscent of the O'Mahoney-Borah Bill 2 of some years
ago which would have provided for the appointment by a federal agency of a
"certified corporation representative" who would be named proxy for the
absent shareholders and who would represent them at the meeting. There
would seem to be no major objection to a natural emergence of private groups 8
dedicated to the furtherance of the cause of the small independent shareholder,
but cogent objections to entrusting what have been traditionally the corporate
owners' functions and duties to a governmental agency, where strict necessity
does not so postulate, suggest opposition to a certified corporate representative.
In 1941 the SEC considered the problem of non-solicitation and listed
some suggestions for remedying it. At that time the Commission said:
51. Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REv. 796, 821
(1950).
52. S.3o72, H.R. 9589, 75 Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
53. E.g., the Federation of Women Shareholders under the leadership of Wilma
Soss. Recall the American Investors Union for the purposes of studying corporate reports
and prospective securities issues for the help and education of the uniformed and un-
trained. It had its counterpart in England in the Shareholders' Protective Association.
SEC
Through its administration of the proxy regulations the Commis-
sion has become increasingly aware that some issuers have avoided
adequate disclosure to their stockholders by the simple device of not
soliciting proxies. This is especially vicious because, in many cases,
the failure to solicit proxies prevents the presence of a quorum and
thus results in self-perpetuation of management. As a consequence,
stockholders are deprived of an opportunity to pass upon the activi-
ties of management and to remove bad management from office.5 4
The amendment proposed by the SEC5 at that time was the insertion of a
requirement in the Securities Exchange Act "that issuers submit to their
security holders prior to meetings the information required by the proxy
rules." 8  It was felt that the effect of this suggestion would be "to re-
enfranchise security holders who have been denied the opportunity of casting
their ballots because of the reluctance of some managements to make adequate
disclosure under the proxy regulations.
'57
A close inspection of the recommendation indicates that the Commission
was not suggesting a mandatory annual proxy but only that the disclosure
materials be given the shareholders. This would mean that the shareholder
would receive the information but would not receive the proxy forms requisite
to the actual mechanics of voting. The shareholder would be informed, but
would not be an informed voter.
Whether the Commission at that time fully intended this dichotomy is
debatable. The SEC would understandably be reluctant to ask for an annual
mandatory proxy in so many words, and yet there seems no other feasible
solution to the problem. Once the requirement of the proxy materials has
been made, the added requisite of the proxy itself is a very slight addition;
yet the information without the mechanics of the vote is bootless. These con-
siderations lead quite logically, it is submitted, to the recommendation of the
annual mandatory proxy. An annual meeting, the information needed' to
form an intelligent judgment and the actual opportunity to vote-all seem
reasonable demands on the part of the shareholder as just rights incident to
his ownership in the corporation. Under the present-day system of dispersed
holdings, distant meeting-places, and the use of the mailed-in proxy, the
most feasible guarantee of corporate democracy is the annual mandatory
proxy and proxy statement.
II. THE DOUBLE STANDARD OF APPLICABILITY
The second major defect in the present Act is the anomalous double
standard of applicability. Two great groups of U. S. corporations are
54. REPORT OF THE SEC, op. cit. supra note 19, at 35.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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separated only by the arbitrary norm of (1) registration of securities on a
national securities exchange, (2) operation of a public utility holding company
or (3) investment company. Investors with securities in these classifications
are guaranteed the protections of the SEC proxy provisions; all others are
not,'though the "other companies [may be] of comparable importance, and
public interest." '
The fact that a large segment of the U. S. corporations are not subject to
SEC regulations does not, of course, establish actual abuse or oppression
of shareholders; at the same time there exists marked possibilities of abuse
outside the restraining pale of the SEC. An illustration is that of the Ward
LaFrance Truck Corporation. 9
In 1941, the Ward La France Truck Corporation, of Elmira, New
York, operated a successful business in fire apparatus and motor trucks with
net profits for the year ending December 31 of $77,000 after taxes. With the
advent of the war and the demand for trucks and heavy mechanical equipment,
the company's net profits increased to $384,000 after taxes for the eleven
month period ended November 30, 1942. This represented an increase in
earnings per share on securities outstanding of 'over 500%-from $2.73 in
1941 to $15.75 in 1942.60
As of September, 1942, Ward La France had outstanding 10,500 shares
of its Class A stock, with one vote per unit, and 17,202 shares of Class B
stock, with one and one-half vote per unit. With the exception of 7,171
shares of the Class A in the hands of the public, A. Ward La France and Joseph
Grossman, president and treasurer respectively of the company, owned all of
the outstanding stock and hence held 80% of the voting power of the
corporation. 61
58. REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. supra note 19, at v.
59. The report of this investigation was contained in Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 3445 (June 12, 1943). The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted an in-
vestigation into the Ward La France transaction pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (It should be observed that the investigation was not
initiated under the proxy regulations of the Commission.)
60. The following table indicates the rapid and substantial increase in profits:
Year ended 8 moinths ended ii months ended
Dec. 31, 1941 Aug. 31, 1942 Nov. 30, 1942
Net income before Federal Income
and Excess Profit taxes: $159,845.27 $1,300,729.52 $1,764,448.89
Net Income after: 77,590.46 384,976.28
Earnings per share on
securities then outstanding: 2.73 15.75
Securities Exchange Act Release, op. cit. supra note 59, at 2.
61. Securities Exchange Act Release, op. cit. supra note 59, at 2 et passim. La France
and Grossman owned 74% of the outstanding shares.
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Contemplating the continued war profits,6 2 La France and Grossman
entered into private negotiations with S. A. Odlum of Salta Corporation
culminating in the execution of an agreement whereby:
1) La France and Grossman would receive $900,000 for the bulk of
their stock. This represented $45.86 per share. s
2) The Board of Directors of Ward La France would adopt a plan of
liquidation, effecting a transfer of all the corporate assets to Salta as a going
concern. 4 Liquidation would result in the payment of the book value of
$28.03 per share to the minority public shareholders.
3) Salta would retain La France and Grossman for seven years at an
annual salary of $60,000 each until cessation of the war, and thereafter at
$20,000.6
Salta had received the balance sheets and earnings statements of Ward
La France which revealed the appreciable increases in the months of 1942.66
Moreover during the period prior to and during the negotiations, La France,
Grossman and Salta, as well as the corporation itself, availed themselves of
insider trading profits.
67
Since the plan of liquidation envisaged by the agreement necessitated
shareholder approval, a stockholders' meeting was called for November 23,
1942, to pass on the plan, which La France and Grossman had already caused
the directors to approve.68
An announcement of the shareholders' meeting was mailed to each share-
holder. The proxy soliciting letter was brief, concise, and altogether un-
informative:
To the Stockholders:.
At a meeting held today the Board of Directors of your corporation
declared it advisable to dissolve the corporation and approved a Plan
of Liquidation. . . . This plan provides for the payment to each
stockholder . . . of his proportionate share of the net assets of the
corporation in cash upon surrender of the certificates for shares of
stock which he owns ...
In the event that you cannot attend the meeting, please sign and
return the enclosed proxy in the enclosed envelope.
(Signed) 69
62. In addition to the factor of continuing war profits was the attractive savings in
excess profits taxes. Salta had a large tax base and hence could avoid heavier taxes to
which Ward La France would be subject.
63. Securities Exchange Act Release, op. cit. supra note 59, at 3.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 4 et passim. Due to the extent of the La France and Grossman holdings
any purchases effected for Ward La France resulted in their benefit and were tantamount
to purchases made directly by themselves.
68. Id. at 4, 5.
69. (Emphasis added). Id. at 14.
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Beyond this letter the shareholders received nothing that would inform them
of the conditions surrounding the dissolution. 1) At no time did the share-
holders learn of the increase of profits from $77,000 in 1941 to $384,000 in
the first eleven months of 1942.70 2) The private sale to Salta of the La
France-Grossman stock was not revealed. 3) The differential between the
$45.86 per share for the La France-Grossman interest and the $28.03 per
share paid the public shareholders was kept secret.71 4) The agreement to
rehire La France and Grossman at salaries of $60,000 per annum was
likewise suppressed.
The result of the proxy solicitations was complete approval at the share-
holders' meeting of the plan of liquidation. There were rio dissenting votes. 2
The proxy announcement had succeeded in disclosing nothing, had gained
blanket power and had effected in full the plans of La France, Grossman
and Salta.
A correlative consideration of the disclosure requirements of Regulation
X-14 and the conduct of the Ward La France solicitation shows the sharp
contrasts between regulated and unregulated firms.. In the light of this
illustration two questions arise: How many firms are unregulated? How
many follow disclosure practices akin to Ward La France's?
THE 'UNREGULATED SEGMENT'
Knowledge of how great a segment of the investing public shares in the
protection of the proxy rules is essential to a determination of what remedies
should be written into the Securities Exchange Act. Two Commission
70. Securities Exchange Act Release, op. cit. supra note 59, at 2.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Ibid. The financial editor of the Chicago Herald-American recently noted share-
holder concern over abuse in a similar proxy solicitation:
"On May 10, stockholders of the Camden Forge Company will be asked to approve
an amendment to the concern's certificate of incorporation, changing the tenure of office
of directors from one to three years with only one-third of the board to be elected each
year.
Unlike the Montgomery Ward & Co. charter, which permits such clange by majority
action of directors, it is necessary for two-thirds of the Camden Forge stockholders to
approve before this backward step can be taken.
It is unthinkable that stockholders will ratify the proposal. One business man in
sending his proxy against the plan, described it as 'an undemocratic corporate subterfuge
to perpetuate management in office.'
In this particular instance, the management, with arrogant disregard of fair treatment
of stockholders, makes no provision on the proxy for a negative vote.
Under normal circumstances the Securities and Exchange Commission would prevent
such a one-sided presentation, but inasmuch as Camden Forge stock is not listed on a
registered securities exchange the SEC lacks jurisdiction over its proxy solicitation.
Undemocratic corporate managements, intent upon concentrating more and more
power in their hands, serve to weaken the American system of private enterprise." Robert
P. Vanderpoel, Chicago Herald-American, Financial Section, May 3, 1949.
SEC
surveys, published in 1946 and 1950, lay the base for considering the number
and size of unregulated corporations.
In its 1950 report the SEC indicates that a study of the corporations
having assets of at least $3,000,000 and 300 security holders yields 1741
corporations not subject to Regulation X-14.73  Set off against this figure are
2194 corporations listed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.74 Bearing
in mind that not all large U. S. corporations are included in the SEC figure
of 1741 (since a number have less than 300 shareholders and others are
exempt), it is consequently a sound inference that roughly one-half of the
larger U. S. corporations are unregulated by SEC proxy rules.7 5  The Com-
mission's 1946 report indicated substantially the same state of regulation,
as the 1950 report, with some increase towards a higher percentage of
non-regulation in 1950.71
The value of the securities issued by the larger corporations only, covered
in the 1950 report, is estimated at $19,000,000,000; they are traded at the
rate of $1.5 billion annually.77  From this it can be seen that these firms,
73. A Proposal to Safeguard Investors, op. cit. supra note 19, at 17, 18. The break-
down of this figure of 1741 can be achieved by reference to the table compiled by the
SEC in this same report, at 18.
74. Hearings on S.24o8, op. cit. supra note 19, at 18.
75. There is further support for this conclusion in the number of corporations that
are technically subject to Regulation X-14 but due to a loophole in the provisions of the
1934 Act do not provide their shareholders with the benefits of the proxy provisions.
These corporations may be estimated to be one-third of those corporations actually regis-
tering their securities on a national exchange. For figures, see 13 SEC ANN. REP. 33,
42 (1947) ; 15 SEC ANN. REP. 34, 48 (1949).
76. The estimates made by the Commission in the 1946 report indicated about 3,090
corporations with $3,000,000 in assets and 300 or more security holders, excluding banks.
Thus the following summary excludes, as did the 1950 report, the smaller firms which
seldom register their stocks on a national exchange, and are neither public utility holding
companies or investment companies.
L Reporting to Securities and Exchange Commission under:
(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ............................ 1,455
(b) Other acts (and not under 1934 Act)
(1) Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ........ 38
(2) Investment Company Act .......................... 98
136
1,591
II. Reporting publicly to other Federal agencies, but not to the Securities
and Exchange Commission: .............................................. 102
III. Reporting only to State commissions: .................................... 397
IV. Companies not making public reports to Federal or State agencies (estimated) 1,000
V. Total (estimated) ....................................................... 3,090
A REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. supra note 19, at 25.
77. A Proposal to Safeguard Investors op. cit. supra note 19, at 18, 19.
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unregulated by the proxy provisions, form a most substantial segment of our
economy.
78
The SEC also reported on the amount of assets of certain large corpora-
tions, none subject to the proxy rules, which have voting securities admitted to
unlisted trading privileges on the New York Curb Exchange. In this 1950
report, the following corporations had the largest amount of assets :79
Number of
Company Assets Stockholders
Humble Oil & Refining Co. $861,400,000 11,617
Creole Petroleum Corp. 618,900,000 4,600
Aluminum Company of America 503,600,000 4,923 (pfd.)
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company 322,800,000 Not disclosed"
Weyerhaeuser Timber Company 210,100,000 Not disclosed8'
Singer Manufacturing Company 202,900,000 3,800
Many other companies that occupy a prominent position in U. S. business
find themselves beyond the reach of the SEC proxy provisions. These in-
clude: American Book Company, Carnation Company, Chesebrough Mfg.
Co., Claude Neon Inc., Crown Cork International Corp., Durham Hosiery
Mills, New Jersey Zinc Co., Goodman Mfg. Co., Gorhanm Mfg. Co., Great
Northern Paper, Glen Alden Coal Co., Horn and Hardart, Lit Brothers,
Pepperell Mfg. Co., Pitney-Bowes, Prentice-Hall, Segal Lock, Sherwin-
Williams, John B. Stetson, Technicolor, Inc., Thew (Lorain) Shovel Co., 2
Remington Arms, Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., American Optical, and
Anerican Potash and Chemical Corporations.3  The remaining 1500 un-
regulated corporations remain uncategorized and as a group unknown.
78. Speaking about the need for removal of the double standard of applicability, Harry
A. McDonald, Chairman of the SEC said:
"Approximately 1,100 companies not now required to file any reports with the Commission
and about 650 additional companies which file some but not all of the reports required by
sections 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act would be affected by the pro-
posed amendment. Although, in terms of numbers, these corporations constitute a rela-
tively small segment of our economy, they represent a considerable portion of the larger
aggregations of capital and they have a very significant effect on the national welfare."
A Proposal to Safeguard Investors, op. cit. supra note 19, at v.
. 79. Id. at 19. In the report the SEC covered only 96 corporations, all of which were
domestic industrial corporations not subject to the proxy regulations and whose voting
securities had been admitted to unlisted trading privileges on the Curb Exchange. These
companies were chosen regardless of number of security holders, volume of trading or
size of company. Id. at 10.
80. In the 1946 report, note 19 supra, the number of stockholders of the Great At-
lantic and Pacific Tea Company was 14,217.
81. In the 1946 report, note 19 supra, the number of stockholders of Weyerhaeuser
Timber Company was 803.
82. All of these firms and many more ar6 listed in Appendix C in A Proposal to
Safeguard Investors, op. cit. supra note 19, at 67, 68, 69.
83. The last four firms were listed by Louis Loss, Associate General Counsel, SEC,
in an address, Some Aspects of the Securities and E.xcchange Commission's Legislative
SEC
The 1946 report created a similar impression as to the number 4 and
size of the unregulated corporations.8 5
THE EXTENT OF ABusE IN UNREGULATED FIR'MS
Since opportunity for abuse is one thing and actual abuse another, the
SEC took a representative sampling of the 1741 corporations and investigated
in detail their proxy-soliciting practices. The study was made in 1949
and included an examination of all proxy-soliciting materials sent out in
1948 and 1949 by 96 corporations which are admifted to unlisted trading
privileges on the New York Curb Exchange."' A total of 202 meetings87
were held by these firms.8 8
The following words of tlhe 1950 report epitomize the results of the
survey:
In only ten of all the 144 meetings where action was taken upon
matters other than the election of directors were the stockholders
accorded a right to vote with respect to the specific item to be con-
sidered at the meeting. In the other 104 instances the stockholders
Program, delivered at New York City before the New York Young Republican Club,
April 28, 1949, at page 7.
84. A REPORT OF THE SEC (1946) op. cit. supra note 19, at 77. The 1946 survey made
by the staff of the Commission examined 76 corporations whose voting securities had
been admitted to unlisted trading privileges on the Curb Exchange and whose assets
exceeded $3,000,000 and were traded in a volume over 5,000 shares in the year 1944.
85. See, A REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. supra note 19, at 22.
86. Of the 76 corporations included in the 1946 study, 61 were also in the 1950 report.
87. Of these, 191 were annual meetings and 11 special meetings. A Proposal to
Safeguard Investors, op. cit. supra note 19, at 10.
88. The following breakdown indicates the subjects which were under discussion at
the meetings for which the proxies were solicited:
Election of directors
Approval of auditors
Approval of all acts of management
Bonus and profit-sharing plans, including stock options
Pension and insurance plans
Management employment contracts
Compensation of directors
By-law and charter amendments providing for indemification
of officers and directors
Supervisory contract with an affiliate
Modification of an underwriting contract
Purchase and sale of property
Merger agreement
Authorization for new or additional securities
Modification or exchange of securities
Authorization for purchase of outstanding securities
Retirement of treasury shares
Approval of charitable contributions
Miscellaneous by-law and charter amendments
Id. at 11.
Number of Meetings
191
30
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were compelled either to vest absolute discretion in the proxy holder
or be disenfranchised."'
A summary analysis of this report shows the extent to which the
standards of disclosure established by the SEC are not satisfied by the
unregulated corporations:
1) Election of Directors. In 84% of the instances when proxies
were requested for the election of directors, the shareholder was not
informed of the names of the men who were nominated for the
board."°
2) Remuneration of Management. In 185 out of the 191 times
(or 97%) when proxies were sought for the election of directors
the remuneration of management was not disclosed, either individu-
ally or in the aggregate. Moreover, in 95 % of the instances the secur-
ity holdings of officers and directors were not revealed.9
3) Selection of Independent Auditors. In practically all of the
instances where shareholders were asked to approve auditors for the
coming year, the name of the auditing firm remained undisclosed 92
4) Blanket Ratification of Management Acts. On 54 occasions
the shareholders were asked to execute proxies for the blanket
approval and ratification of all acts of management since the last
annual meeting. These requests were made in the face of non-
disclosure of the nature of the acts, when it was clear from other
sources that material and important transactions had been effected
in the interim.
93
5) Pension Plans. In approximately 80% of the cases where
shareholders were asked for proxies in approval of pension plans
the amounts payable to directors and officers were not disclosed,
nor was the cost to the company divulged. 4
6) Issuance of New Securities. In approximately 50% of the
cases where the shareholder was asked to approve the issuance of
new securities or the modification of the rights of existing securities,
there was no financial statement accompanying the proxy.95
A comparison of the findings in the comparable survey made by the
Commission in 194696 indicates such slight improvements as to invalidate
89. Id. at 11, 12. Emphasis added.
90. Id. at 12.
91. Ibid.
92. Id.,at 12, 13. In some cases it was apparent that the company intended to change
auditors, a fact which made the names of the auditors particularly relevant.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. at 15. There is an unusual device commented on in the Senate hearings:
In one case that came to our attention the form of the proxy appeared
on the back of the dividend check, so that if you endorsed your check you
gave a proxy. That lawyer, of course, well earned his fee.
From the testimony of Louis Loss, Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 24.
96. In the 1946 study the Commission examined the proxy-soliciting materials sent to
the stockholders of 76 corporations, none subject to the SEC proxy provisions. The
materials examined were sent for 152 meetings-142 annual meetings and 10 special
meetings. The following is a summary of the survey:
SEC
any conjecture that managerial despotism is becoming more benevolent.97
Hence it may be concluded that the double standard of applicability has
actually resulted in a double standard of conduct.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There seems to be little question as to the need for broadening the
coverage of the 1934 Act. It is difficult to adduce reasons for denying the
protective benefits of the SEC proxy provisions to one great segment of U.S.
investors while guaranteeing them to another. This is the more true when
there is little logic in the criteria of separation. Historically the congressional
aim was uniform investor protection. " - The caution attending a venture into
a new field prompted the proponents of the original bill to confine themselves
to the safer and more generally known area of listed securities."9 But the argu-
ments, originally advanced and generally accepted,10 which impelled Congress
to enact the existing provisions, likewise support extending the Act's benefits
to all corporations of similar size, importance, and number of shareholders.
The Frear Bill. Recommendations for a wider application of the SEC
proxy regulations are contained in the Frear Bill'"' which was introduced and
considered last year in the Senate by the Banking and Currency Subcommit-
tee.1 2 The Bill contemplates the addition of a new subsection to Section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act requiring companies engaged in interstate
(1) In only 16 of the 142 annual meetings were the nominees for directorates named
in the materials.
(2) Only four companies offered an opportunity for a 'Yes" or "No" vote on the
individual items of business to be transacted at the meeting.
(3) The remuneration of management, either individually or in the aggregate, was
not stated in any of the proxy-soliciting materials.
(4) In only one case was there disclosure of the personal interest of officers and
directors, or of their associates, in any of the matters to be acted upon.
(5) In roughly half of the proxies there was to be blanket approval and ratification
of all acts and proceedings of management since the last annual meeting without specifi-
cation of the acts.
A REPORT OF THE SEC (1946), op. cit. supra note 19, at 75, 76.
97. Speaking for the SEC, Louis Loss, Associate General Counsel, stated:
"We found some improvement over 1946, but most of the companies, most of the
presently unregulated companies, continued to request their stockholders to give their
proxies, exercise their corporate franchise, without any adequate information." Hearings
on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 23.
98. Thus in its original form Section 15 of the Securities Exchang6 Act made pro-
vision for such Commission rules as are "necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and to insure the investors protection comparable to that provided . . . in the case of
national securities exchanges." 48 STAT. 895 (1933-1934). See discussion of this point
in Hearings on S. 24o8, op. cit. supra note 19, at 15, 16.
99. Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 15, 16. The sanction was directed
against the dealers trading in the securities and not against the corporations. Hence no
such sanction was exercisable as to unlisted securities.
100. Id. at 11.
101. See note 19 supra for brief details of previous attempts at similar legislation.
102. The testimony is in Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19.
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commerce 03 to register with the SEC all securities not already listed on an
exchange. Registration would have the same consequence as listing1 '
However, only those companies with assets of $3,000,000 or more and 300
or more security holders would be subject to the legislation.105 Due to the
backlog of more pressing legislation no action was taken on the bill. It is
expected that it will be reintroduced in 1951.16
The Frear Bill offers an excellent plan for plugging a major loophole in
federal securities regulation. It would provide the shareholder in unlisted
securities a voice in management which he now seldom has. It would require
substantial disclosure; but it would not cure the evils depicted in Part I
of this article.
The principal objections to the Bill,10 7 beyond the traditional opposition
to any federal supervision, 08 might be listed as threefold:109 1) the expense
of compliance, 2) the arbitrary nature of the norm of application, 3) the
harm to the over-the-counter market.
103. (Emphasis added). The new subsection (g) reads: "(1) Every issuer which
is engaged in interstate commerce or in business affecting interstate commerce, or the
securities of which are regularly traded by use of the mails or any means of instru-
mentality of interstate commerce . . ." S. 2408, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
104. Subsection (g) (1) imposes on the issuer the proxy provisions of -Section 14 of
the Securities Exchange Act "with the same force and effect as if all the securities of any
such issuer were registered pursuant to subsection (b)." - S. 2406, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949). The Frear Bill, of course, in effecting uniformity of application of the
Securities Exchange Act would thereby affect also the registration, periodic reporting and
insider trading provisions of 'that Act as well.
105. These figures were originally suggested by the New York Stock Exchange
and the New York Curb Exchange. Louis Loss, Associate General Counsel of the
SEC, said: ". . . The New York Exchanges-not the Commission but the two New
York exchanges-suggested three.quarters of what is now the Frear Bill." Hearings on
S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 17.
106. The sponsor of the bill, Senator Frear, on September 27, 1950 communicated
to the writer that he intends reintroducing the bill early in 1951.
107. Opposition to the Frear Bill has come mainly from management, with two
major spokesmen for management, the National Association of Manufacturers and the
Chamber of Commerce, being the most vocal.
The financial community has in general supported the bill. Senator Frear lists the
following supporters: Investment Bankers Association, National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, New York Stock Exchange, New York Curb Exchange, and others.
Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19; 96 CoNG. REc. No. 186, 15366 (September 19,
1950). Presidential approval was made public on the first day of the subcommittee hear-
ings. Needless to say, "independent public shareholders are fully in sympathy with the
objectives of the bill . . ." Gilbert, Management and the Public Shareholder, 28 HARV.
Bus. REv., No. 4, 79, 80 (July, 1950).
108. Good summaries of this class of opposition can be found in the testimony and
statements of the following: Cyrus S. Eaton,' Senator James Murray, the National
Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 150, 157, 199, 216.
109. Lesser objections to the bill have taken the form of speculation as to the effect
of the legislation on equity security offerings, institutional buying, and the general
reactions of issuers, investors and the market to the changed requirements. In the main
the result would most likely be increased buying by the small investor with consequent
increases in equity offerings. This would eliminate the fear of a rush of institutional
SEC
The cost of compliance should not be burdensome for the greater majority
of the corporations affected, since the average U.S. firm with assets of
$3,000,000 or more already maintains the necessary accounts and records."'
Objections to the norm of applicability are such as would be lvelled at
any norm. The figures selected have been discussed for. a decade,"' and
represent a practicable working criterion subject to change with the ex-
perience of the years." 2
The fact that both the Curb and Stock Exchanges favor, the bill"' bears
out the conclusion that the amendment will not create an unjust advantage
against the over-the-counter market. Any readjustments which might occur
would substantiate the arguments that legislation towards uniformity will put
the two markets on a basis of healthy competition of merits rather than of
legal pressures and happenstances. The basis for listing should be the price
and nature of the security, the extent of speculative interest, the amount
of trading volume, and other straight competitive factors.1 4
One may question the details of the method proposed for achieving cor-
porate democracy and management responsibility. But before shareholders
finally abandon all their rights and duties to management or irretrievably
abdicate their ownership functions to government, serious thought to these
recommendations is warranted. An indication of the failure of the American
way and a sure invitation to totalitarianism is the continued violation of
fiduciary duty by corporate management. Reform here is a part of that
whole which will insure the perpetuation of our free enterprise system.
investors. Such a prognostication is supported by the fact that added confidence would
be engendered in the small investor by the full disclosure pursuant to the regulations of
the Act. See, The Frear Bill: Extension of Investor Protection to Unlisted Securities,
45 ILL. L. REv. 263 (1950).
110. "The question posed by the proposed legislation is not whether such records
should be maintained, but whether they should be made available to the public stock-
holders-the owners of the enterprise." A Proposal to Safeguard Investors, op. cit. supra
note 19, at 19, 5. For the few corporations lacking such records the bill would perform
the excellent collateral function of raising the accounting standards to an acceptable level.
In any consideration of the expense of compliance the central factor must remain that
the proxy provisions of the Commission guarantee the shareholder a democratic right
that is his due and for which he himself and none other is paying.
111. Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 12, 96 et seq., 140.
112. The exemption authority of the Commission and the added discretion in defining
the phrases surrounding the figures "$3,000,000" and "300" afford the opportunity of
mitigating the onerousness of the arbitrary norm. Subsection (g) (7), S. 2408, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
113. Hearings on S. 2408, op. cit. supra note 19, at 69, 104.
114. Frear, Protection of Investors in Large Corporations, 96 CONG. REc. No. 186,
15365, 15367 (September 19, 1950).
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APPENDIX I
COLLATERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two lesser amendments that logically group themselves around
the question of uniformity of application. (1) The exemption presently
accorded banks" 5 might well be removed. The shareholders in U.S. banks
do receive much indirect protection not accorded other shareholders, but there
seems valid argument for including them in the specific protections of the
proxy provisions. (2) Since Regulation X-14 does not prescribe the content
of information in the annual report and the financial statements but rather
leaves it to the "opinion of the management""' to determine their adequacy,
reasonable amendment would seem to demand a form and content similar to
or, as has been suggested,1 7 identical with Form 10-K-the report made
annually for the purpose of keeping up to date the information filed initially
on registration under the Securities Exchange Act.
Other changes in the Act bear consideration. The expense of solicitation
when not for and on behalf of management presently must be borne by the
shareholder submitting the proposals. Subject to defined maximum costs,
provision might well be made for the corporation to offset the expense of
bona fide shareholder proposals.
A point which has been mentioned previously in connection with the
general disclosure provisions of the SEC is the need of shareholders for a
more understandable correlation of the information dispensed with the prob-
lems of the small investor. The proxy statement should be explained in
non-technical, understandable terms. There should be analysis, and ex-
planation, even to the point of explaining the value of the investment ;118 but
such an advance would appear to be a matter for the Commission in the
formulation of its rules rather than the subject of an amendment.
115. See Subsection (g) (2) (E), S. 2408, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
116. The annual report must contain "such financial statements for the last fiscal
year as will, in the opinion of the management, adequately reflect the financial position
and operations of the issuer. Such annual report, including financial statements, may
be in any form deemed suitable by the management." Rule X-14A-3 (b). For the
prescriptions and conditions surrounding this annual report see Appendix I.
117. Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective
Stockholder Participation, 59 YALE L. J. 633, 675 (1950).
118. See an excellent presentation of the case for such explanation and simplifica.
tion in Rukeyser and Haney, To Simplify or not to Simplify, POINT OF VIEW 12 (May,
1948).
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APPENDIX II
SEC PRoxY REGULATIONS
In all there are nine proxy rules in Regulation X-14 n ° followed by
Schedule 14A which gives the "Information Required in Proxy Statement."'2 0
Rule X-14A-3 requires that no solicitation shall be made ". . unless
each person solicited is concurrently furnished or has previously been furnished
with a written proxy statement containing the information specified in
Schedule 14A." In a management solicitation relating to an annual meeting
at which directors are to be elected, each proxy statement must be accompanied
by an Annual Report. This report shall contain "such financial statements for
the last fiscal year as will, in the opinion of the management, adequately reflect
the financial position and operations of the issuer. Such annual report, includ-
ing financial statements, may be in any form deemed suitable by the
management."
Rule X-14A-4 says the proxy "shall indicate in bold face type whether or
not the proxy is solicited on behalf of the management." It must identify
clearly and impartially each matter intended to be acted upon, whether
proposed by management or by shareholders. There must be means in the
form of proxy whereby the shareholder can specify by ballot his particular
choice in any matter up for decision at the meeting. If there is to be an
election of officers or directors--" (d) No proxy shall confer authority (1) to
vote for the election of any person to any office for which a bona fide
nominee is not named in the proxy statement . . ."
Rule X-14A-5 presents a set of precise directions for handling Schedule
14A. The Schedule requires information about the interest of management,
of nominees for election to directorate, and of their associates; the general
security structure as to voting and the holders of such securities must be
listed. Information on any plan-election, bonus, pension-is required in
119. This Regulation could be said to be the culmination of three years of experience
with proxy control. The Commission on September 24, 1935, promulgated its first rules,
designated the LA rules. These required general information; there was no detailed
requirement as to items to be included. But on August 1, 1938, the Commission issued
Regulation X-14. The requirements now became specific as to what information must
be given. Through the years this Regulation X-14 has been amended constantly. The
Annual Reports of the Commission trace these amendments. For a study see Bernstein
and Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Cor-
porate Democracy, 7 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 226 (1940).
A very detailed and technical commentary on the proxy rules may be found in
Emerson and Latcham, SEC Proxy Regulation: Steps Toward More Effective Stock-
holder Participation, 59 YALE L. J. 633 (1950).
120. The rules and schedule here given embody the most recently proposed amend-
ments. Announced on July 6, 1948, in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4114 (July 6,
1948). For the comments of an attorney of the Commission touching on many of the
0problems surrounding the proxy rules, see Friedman, SEC Regulation of Corporate
Proxies, 63 HARv. L. REv. 796 (1950).
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great detail. No action can be taken without full disclosure. Likewise, the
information required on remuneration and other transactions with the
directors, nominees, officers and others is extensive.
Rule X-14A-6 requires the proxy materials to be filed with the SEC
. at least ten days prior to the date definitive copies of such materials are
first sent or given to security holders . .
X-14A-7 provides that the management must provide a list of share-
holders or mail solicitation materials for any shareholder who so demands.
X-14A-8 states "(a) If any security holder . . . shall submit to the
management . . . a proposal which is a proper subject for action . . .*'1 the
management shall set forth the proposal in its proxy statement and shall iden-
tify the proposal in its form of proxy and provide means by which security
holders can make the specification. . . ." An outstanding illustration of the
possible value of this rule has been created by Mr. James Fuller of Hartford.
Fuller's ownership in seven large firms does not exceed fifteen shares in any
instance, yet he has been able by virtue of Rule X-14A-8 to have American
Tobacco, Consolidated Edison, Curtis Publishing, Woolworth, Allied Stores,
Gimbels and Associated Drygoods submit twenty-five proposals to the
shareholders.
122
X-14A-9 tersely forbids statements which are "false or misleading with
respect to any material fact . . ."
This is the whole of the administrative control of the proxy.
121. The Transamerica Corporation case well illustrates the application of Regulation
X-14, and Rule X-14A-8 specifically. A shareholder owning seventeen shares in Trans-
america submitted three proposals which he intended to present at the next meeting and
which were, therefore, to be included in the proxy solicitation material sent out by
Transamerica. Notice of the proposals was not included in the proxy statement as re-
quired by X-14A-8. The result: the SEC sought and obtained an injunction to prevent
Transamerica from soliciting proxies.
The shareholder's requests were: (1) independent auditors-to be chosen by the
stockholders at the annual meeting; (2) elimination of the by-law requirement that notice
of any alteration of the by-laws be given in the notice of the meeting; (3) a post-
meeting report for the shareholders. The corporation maintained that the proposals were
not "proper subjects," within Rule X-14A-8. But the court thought otherwise:
"True it may cost Transamerica $20,000 annually, but accurate information as to
what transpires respecting the corporation is an absoluute necessity if stockholders are
to act for their joint interest. If stockholders cannot act together, they cannot act ef-
fectively." (Emphasis added). SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3rd Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). See Note, Permissible Scope of the Stockholder
Proposals under SEC Proxy Rules, 57 YALE L.J. 874 (1948). See also Doyle v. Milton,
73 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
122. For the full details see Hearings Before House Committee, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 224-230.
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